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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the efficacy of regional and federal government policies in reducing 
inter-regional unemployment disparities. We use as our framework a two-region general 
equilibrium model with a given freely-mobile supply of labour.  We assume inter-
regional migration to occur in response to inter-regional utility differentials.  Each region 
has households, firms and a regional government.  In addition to regional governments, 
there is a federal government.  The firms in a region use a single factor, labour, to 
produce a single good which we assume to be different to that produced in the other 
region.  It is supplied to households and to the regional government in the form of payroll 
taxes.  Households consume some, trade some with households in the other region and 
give some up to the federal government as income tax.  Firms and households bargain 
over wages and firms then choose employment to maximise profits.  The resulting 
equilibrium will generally not be a full-employment one. 
We simulate a linearised numerical version of the model.  We examine seven alternative 
policies, six carried out by a regional government and one by the federal government. In 
the first group there are traditional tax/expenditure polices as well as policies which 
might be seen as attacking the natural rate of unemployment: changes in unemployment 
benefits, changes in union power, changes in the labour force and changes in labour 
productivity.  The federal government policy is a regionally- differentiated fiscal policy.   
Contrary to expectations, many policies which have traditionally been recommended to 
alleviate unemployment, are found, in fact, to exacerbate the unemployment problem. 
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1. Introduction 
In the late 1960s economists became aware of a phenomenon not previously 
widely analysed.  This was the phenomenon of regional unemployment disparities – the 
persistence of unemployment at a significantly higher level in some of the regional 
economies than in the national economy itself.  To the economists who observed this 
phenomenon it seemed likely that it would be of considerable concern to both national 
and regional governments. 
National governments could be expected to see regional unemployment disparities 
in social-justice terms.  The working rule would be that those of its citizens who lived in 
one region of the nation should have the same access to publicly-provided goods of a 
welfare-enhancing kind as those who lived in the other regions.  Those who live in region 
1 should have the same educational opportunities as those who live in regions 2, 3, 4,…, 
public health systems, public libraries, public symphony orchestras of a comparable 
standard and equally safe road systems.  Following this line of thought, they could be 
expected to argue, when faced with the phenomenon of regional unemployment 
disparities, that those of its citizens who lived in region 1 should have the same 
employment opportunities as those who lived in regions 2, 3, 4,… In other words, 
national governments could be expected to find regional unemployment disparities a 
matter of considerable concern. 
The same would be true of regional governments, though their line of thought 
would not be quite so lofty.   The government of a region with unemployment 
persistently above the national figure would see this as a threat to survival because it 
would provide an easy target for its opponents.  They would be able to attribute the 
existence of the disparity to the incompetence of the government and to claim that they 
would remove it if elected. 
In short, it was concluded by the economists that, one way or another, the   
phenomenon of regional unemployment disparities was likely to be a matter of 
considerable concern to national and regional governments.  This being the case, the 
question which needed to be addressed was whether regional unemployment disparities 
can be reduced by policy action on the part of national or regional governments; and it 
was this question which motivated the seminal work of Thirlwall (1966).   3
Thirlwall approached the policy question through a prior question: how do 
unemployment disparities arise? His view was that once we know how unemployment 
disparities come about we will be well-placed to propose policies for reducing them.  
This being so, the first step must be to advance a hypothesis relating to the causes of 
observed regional unemployment-rate disparities and proceed to test this hypothesis 
against relevant empirical data.  If the hypothesis stands up we have a basis for proposing 
policy measures that might deal with the problem. 
Proceeding along these lines, he tested the hypothesis that the immediate cause of 
observed regional unemployment-rate disparities are differences between regions as 
regards sensitivity to the national cycle, these differences being due, in turn, to a 
combination of differences between industries as regards sensitivity to the national cycle 
and differences between regions as regards industry composition.  Thirlwall tested this 
hypothesis against UK data and found reasonable support.  He was not prepared to go 
further, however, and use what he had found to address the policy problem.  His final 
paragraph read that more research into the causes of disparities is required before policies 
for dealing with the problem can be formulated. 
  Thirlwall’s call for further research into the causes did not go unheeded. 
Numerous studies which adopted his basic analytical approach with extensions and/or 
elaborations have continued to appear until recent times.  These include Brechling 
(1967), Harris and Thirlwall (1968), Elias (1978, 1979, 1980), Gordon (1979, 1980, 
1985), Bell (1981), Forrest and Naisbitt (1988), Byers (1990), Chapman (1991), 
Groenewold (1991), Debelle and Vickery (1998, 1999), McGuire (2001), Dixon et al. 
(2001), Weiler (2001) and Brunello et al. (2001).  Empirical work on regional 
unemployment disparities, not necessarily in the Thirlwall framework, has also been 
reported by Groenewold and Hagger (1995), Groenewold (1997) and Dixon and 
Shepherd (2001) for Australia; by Baddeley et al. (1998) and Cameron and Muellbauer 
(2001) for the UK; by Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) for Spain; by Pehkonen and Tervo 
(1998) and Tervo (2000) for Finland and by Galiani et al. (2005) for Argentina.  
The intensive research along Thirlwall lines appears, however, to have stopped 
short of a solution of the policy problem.  Moreover, a recent paper, Dixon and Shepherd 
(2001), suggests that what has been contributed is suspect.  Among other things, this   4
paper details several basic statistical problems connected with a Thirlwall-type analytical 
approach.  These would undermine any policy conclusions to which it might give rise. 
There is, then, an important gap in the literature to be filled.  The present paper 
aims to help in this direction.  We use as our framework of a two-region general 
equilibrium model taken from a class which has played an important part in the fiscal-
federalism literature, viz., models of multi-regional federations with a given freely-
mobile supply of labour. A model of this class has been used in, e.g.,  Boadway and 
Flatters (1982), Myers (1990), Petchey (1993, 1995), Petchey and Shapiro (2000) and 
Groenewold, Hagger and Madden (2000, 2003).  In these models labour is allowed to 
migrate costlessly between regions in search of maximum welfare and they typically 
impose, as an equilibrium condition, that the utility of the representative household be the 
same in all regions.   
The model which we build has two regions, each with households, firms and a 
regional government.  In addition to regional governments, there is also a federal 
government.  The households and firms are optimizers but the governments are not; the 
fiscal decisions of the governments are treated as exogenous.
1   
The firms in a region produce a single good which we assume to be different to 
that produced in the other region.  It is supplied to households and to the regional 
government.  Households consume some, trade some with households in the other region 
and give some up to the federal government as income tax.  Governments costlessly 
transform the good into a government good.  The regional government supplies the 
transformed good in equal amounts to households in its region free of charge and 
finances the purchase of the good by a payroll tax levied on firms located in its region.  
The federal government provides output to households in both regions (possibly different 
amounts per capita) and finances this by a tax levied at a uniform rate on household 
incomes in both regions. 
                                                 
1  Recent work has extended models of this type by making the regional governments behave in an 
optimizing way, commonly by assuming that regional governments are beneficent in that they choose their 
tax and expenditure levels so as to maximise the utility of their citizens subject to the constraints imposed 
by the structure of the economy.  Such an approach has been used in, e.g. Petchey (1993), Petchey and 
Shapiro (2000, 2002) and Groenewold, Hagger and Madden (2000, 2003).   
   5
Output is produced using a single factor, labour, which is supplied by households.  
We assume that households supply labour only to firms in the region in which they live, 
thus excluding the possibility that they live in one region and commute to work in the 
other.  Regional population and labour force are therefore effectively the same. We do 
allow inter-regional migration, however, and this is one of three sources of inter-
connectedness between the two regions.  We follow the literature cited above and assume 
migration to occur in response to inter-regional utility differentials.   
We model the labour market in each region by assuming bargaining between 
firms and a union which represents households.  Unions are assumed to bargain with 
firms over wages and firms then decide on employment to maximise profits.  There is no 
reason why employment should equal the labour force in equilibrium so that, despite its 
Walrasian nature, the model allows for equilibrium unemployment.  Since migration 
equalises utility and not unemployment across regions, there is no reason why 
unemployment rates should be equalised by the forces of migration.  In this sense the 
model generates endogenous unemployment disparities as the outcome of any differences 
in exogenous variables and parameters across regions and the disparities can be thought 
of in terms of compensating differentials. 
There are therefore three sources of interconnectedness between the regions – 
inter-regional migration, inter-regional trade and the redistribution carried out by the 
federal government. We abstract from other possible inter-regional connections.  So, we 
assume that each regional government supplies the government good only to households 
living in its own region, thus abstracting from inter-regional spillover effects in the 
provision of government goods. Further, we assume that each firm is owned by 
households in the region in which it is located.  Given our earlier assumption that firms 
employ labour only from households in the region, we also abstract completely from 
inter-regional factor income flows. 
The resulting model is highly non-linear.  For this reason it cannot be solved 
analytically and so cannot be used, as it stands, to address the question with which the 
paper is concerned – whether there are policies through which regional unemployment 
disparities can be removed.  We get round this difficulty by using a process of log-
differentiation to linearise the model which is then calibrated from Australia data and   6
used to simulate the effects of a variety of shocks designed to capture policies which 
might be used to combat unemployment disparities.   
 
2.  The model 
2.1  The representative household 
2 
  The representative household of region i operates with a utility function of the 
form:   
(1) 
1i 2i i δ
i1 i 2 i i VC C G i
γγ β = ,    i = 1, 2 
where Vi  =  utility of the representative household, region i, 
 C 1i  =  real private consumption of good 1 per household, region i, 
 C 2i  =  real private consumption of good 2 per household, region i, 
 G i  =  real government-provided consumption per household, region i. 
βi , γji and δi are constants with: 
  0 i > β  
 0  <  γji < 1 
 0  <  δi < 1 
  γ1i + γ2i + δi  = 1 
  The representative household in region i takes Gi as given and chooses Cji 
(j=1,2) so as to maximise Vi  subject to the constraint imposed by its after-tax income: 
 P.C1i + C2i = (1-M)Ji 
where   M   = rate of federal government income tax, 
  P   = price of good 1 in terms of good 2, and 
 J i   = real household income in region i. 
The solution to the household’s problem is given by: 
(2) Cji = (γji/(γ1i+γ2i))(1-M)Ji.P
j-i,     i, j = 1,2 
Real income per household in region i is defined as: 
 J i = ΠHi + Wi* + Ui.UBi,   i  =  1,2 
where  ΠHi = real profit distribution per household, region i 
 W i* = real wage income per household, region i 
                                                 
2 Definitions of all variables and parameters are reproduced in Appendix 1.   7
 U i   = unemployment rate, region i 
 UBi = real unemployment benefits per unemployed person, region i 
Wi*, the real wage per household is interpreted as, Wi, the real wage per worker in region 
i  weighted by the probability of employment in region i.  Hence Wi* can be replaced by 
(Li/Ni)Wi where Wi is the real wage rate in region i, Li is employment in region i and Ni 
is the workforce (= population) in region i.  Using this, Ji can be written as: 
(3) Ji = ΠHi + (Li/Ni).Wi + Ui.UBi = ΠHi + (1-Ui).Wi + Ui.UBi,   i = 1,2 
where we have used the definition of the unemployment rate: 
(4) Ui =(Ni – Li)/Ni = 1 – Li/Ni,    i = 1,2. 
  We assume that inter-regional migration of households exists and that it 
continues until utility per household is equalised in the two regions: 
(5)   V1 = V2 
This formulation incorporates the assumption that inter-regional migration is costless.  
Clearly in practice this is not the case although it is not an uncommon formulation in the 
literature.  There are papers such as Mansoorian and Myers (1993) which explore the 
implications of relaxing this assumption but we start with the simplest assumption and 
leave to further research the extension to costly migration; the analysis in Mansoorian and 
Myers suggests that the discontinuities introduced in this extension will add considerable 
complexity. 
 
2.2 The representative firm 
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where   Yi = output of the representative firm, region i,  
 D i =  productivity parameter, region i, and  
 F i  = the (exogenous) number of firms in region i..   
Given the assumption of decreasing returns to labour, competition will ensure that all 
firms will be of equal size.  
  Firm profits are given by: 
(7)  ΠFi  = Yi – Wi(Li/Fi)(1+Ti),   i  =  1,2   8
where Ti is the rate of payroll tax levied by the regional government in region i. 
We model the labour market using a “right-to-manage” bargaining framework in 
which the wage is determined by the bargaining of firms and unions after which the firms 
choose employment to maximise profits given the bargained wage.  The firm’s profit-
maximising employment condition is the usual marginal productivity condition: 
(8)  () ()
i α 1
ii ii i i α DL / F W 1T
− =+   i = 1,2 
conditional on the bargained wage. 
 
2.3 Wage determination 
  We assume that the wage in region i is determined by a process of negotiation 
between employers and trade unions. The union’s bargaining aim is to push the wage bill 
as high as possible relative to the figure they believe workers could obtain elsewhere in 
the region if the bargaining process breaks down.  In pursuing this aim, however, they are 
constrained by the bargaining aim of the employers which is to preserve profits.  We 
formalise this set of assumptions, following Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), by 
supposing that the bargained wage is the outcome of the following optimisation problem: 
  
i Ω
ii i i i {W } max B ( F) ((W -A )L )
i
=Π ,   0<Ωi<1 
subject to (6) where Ai is the income workers expect to be able to obtain elsewhere in 
region i if a bargain is not reached and  Ωi is a parameter representing union strength in 
the bargaining process in region i.  We assume that Ai depends on both the expected 
wage in the rest of the region (W
e) as well as unemployment benefits (UB): 
 A i = (1-Ui)W
e + Ui.UBi 
where (1-Ui) is taken as the probability of employment elsewhere and Ui the probability 
of unemployment should the bargaining process break down.  We assume that in solving 
the bargaining problem both firms and unions are myopic in the sense that they both 
ignore the effects of wages on employment.  Under these assumptions, the first-order 
condition for the bargaining problem is: 
   Ωi (ΠFi) = (Wi-Ai)(1+Ti)Li   9
Using the definition of Ai, the marginal productivity condition for profit maximisation, 
equation (7), and the assumption that in equilibrium the expected wage (W
e) is equal to 
the actual wage (W), the first-order condition can be rewritten as: 
(9)   Wi,/(Wi-UBi) = (αi/(1-αi))(1/Ωi)Ui   i = 1,2, 
so that there is a simple negative relationship between the equilibrium wage and the 
unemployment rate which is shifted up by an increase in union power as well as by an 
increase in the level of unemployment benefits.   
   
2.4 The regional government 
  The government of region i purchases output from the firms in its region for the 
distribution to households, both as government good and as unemployment benefits, and 
receives revenue from a payroll tax levied at a constant rate in its region. We assume that 
the government of region i balances its budget so that outlay per household and tax 
collections per household are equal.  This gives: 
 N iGRi + (Ni-Li).UBi = LiTiWi,     i = 1,2 
where GRi = the amount of (regional) government good provided per household, region i.   
Using the definition of the unemployment rate, Ui, we can write this condition as: 
(10) GRi + Ui.UBi =  TiWi(1-Ui),     i = 1,2 
 
2.5 The federal government 
  The federal government collects income tax at a fixed rate, M, from all citizens.  
Its total tax collections are M(N1J1+N2J2).  It provides output to the citizens of each 
region, possibly in different amounts.  The output provided to households in region i is 
GFi per capita or NiGFi in total. It too balances its budget so that 
(11) N1GF1 + N2GF2 = M(N1J1 + N2J2).   
  This structure therefore abstracts from the equalisation procedures which are 
common to federations.  While such equalisation arrangements are extensive in Australia, 
there is no reason to believe that their interaction with traditional anti-unemployment 
policies would be likely to substantially alter our results in which case to introduce them 
would be to needlessly complicate the model. 
  10
2.7 Model closure 
  As things stand the model is incomplete in the sense that there are more 
equations than endogenous variables. We remedy this by adding various definitional 
equations which provide extra links between the variables we already have. 
  We begin with a relationship that defines real government-provided 
consumption per household in region i, Gi: 
(12) Gi = GRi + GFi,   i = 1,2. 
  Next, national population (= labour force) is defined by: 
(13) N1 + N2 = N, 
where N is the (exogenous) national population. 
  It is assumed that the representative firm in region i distributes all its profit to 
households in region i.  From this it follows that the representative household’s profits 
receipts (ΠHi) are related to firm profits (ΠFi) by the condition: 
(14) Fi.ΠFi = Ni.ΠHi,    i = 1,2. 
Note that this excludes the possibility that firms in one region are owned by households 
in another and while this is undoubtedly unrealistic, it buys considerable simplicity since 
it reduces the interconnectedness between regions and allows us to focus on the links 
which result from inter-regional trade and migration.  Besides, it is unlikely that in 
practice cross-border firm ownership is an important channel of influence between 
regions. 
  Next, we have a market-clearing condition for the output market in each region: 
(15) Fi.Yi = N1Ci1 + N2Ci2 + NiGRi + NiMJi,     i = 1,2. 
This relationship simply states that output produced in region i is (i) consumed by 
households in the region, or (ii) traded to households in the other region and consumed by 
them, or (iii) paid to region i’s government to be converted to the government good, or 
(iv) paid to the federal government as income tax and converted to the government good.
3   
  Finally, we have a balanced-trade assumption: since there are no assets in the 
mode, we cannot allow either region to consume in excess of its income.  Hence 
(16) C21 = P.C12. 
                                                 
3 Note that some of the payroll tax collected by the regional government is also paid out in the form of 
unemployment benefits; it is assumed that this is still in the form of the consumption good and that 
households either consume it as such or trade it with households in the other region.  11
  The model consists of the 30 equations (1)-(16) in 39 variables Vi, Cji, Gi, ΠHi, 
ΠFi,  Ui, Wi, UBi, P, Li, Ni, Fi, Yi, Ji, Ti, Ωi, GRi, GFi, N and M of which the 11 variables 
UBi, Fi, GRi, Ωi, GFi and N are exogenous. Thus there are 28 endogenous variables.  Two 
equations are redundant since equations (3), (4), (7), (10), (14) and (16) can be used to 
derive (15).  We therefore drop equations (15), leaving 28 equations in 28 endogenous 
variables and 11 exogenous variables. 
 
2.8 The short-run version of the model 
  We define “the short run” as the stretch of time before inter-regional migration 
begins to respond to inequality between V1 and V2.  Using this definition, we can define a 
short-run version of the model just presented by deleting equations (5) and (13) from the 
model and transferring both N1 and N2 from the endogenous to the exogenous category. 
  We shall be making use of this short-run version of the model in what follows.  
When we do so we shall refer to it as the “short-run version of the model” and to the 
model itself as the “long-run version of the model”. 
 
   
3. The linearised numerical version of the model 
3.1 The linearised version of the model 
  The two-region model set out in the previous section is non-linear in the levels 
of the variables and for this reason it cannot easily be used to conduct comparative-static 
exercises which will throw light on the topic of the present paper.  We circumvent this 
problem by using a numerical linearised version of the model which we describe in this 
section. 
  To linearise the model of section 2 we use a process of log differentiation.  This  
converts the model from one which is non-linear in the levels to one which is linear in the 
proportional rates of change of the variables.  The resulting linearised versions of 
equations (1)-(16) are given in Appendix 2. 
 
3.2 The numerical version of the linearized  model  12
  As can be seen from Appendix 2, the linearised model contains a number of 
parameters which have to be evaluated before the model can be put to work. These 
parameters fall into two groups.  The first are parameters which appear in model 
relationships; γji and δi appear in the utility function (1) and αi appears in the production 
function (5).  The remainder are linearization parameters and are all shares of some sort. 
 The  model parameters can be evaluated with the help of model restrictions.  Start 
with αi.  Here we use the marginal productivity condition, equation (9).  Similarly for γji 
and  δi.  Here we follow the approach conventionally adopted by GE modellers and 
calibrate the utility function to ensure that the initial solution is one of utility 
maximisation.
4  Since the relative price of C and G is unity, utility maximisation implies 
that the ratio γji/δi is equal to Cji/Gi.  Then, using the restriction that γ1i + γ2i + δi = 1, we 
have  
  γji = Cji/(C1i+C2i+Gi) ,   
and  
  δi = Gi/(C1i+C2i+Gi).     
The linearization parameters can be evaluated directly from their definitions, 
given values for M, ΠHi, Ji, Ui, Wi, Li, Ni, Ti, NiGFi, NiJi, GRi, Gi, Yi, and ΠFi.  All of 
which can be derived from data on Ci, GRi, LiWi, GFi, Wi, and Ni and the model 
definitions.  
All the model and linearization parameters have the subscript i = 1,2 so that they 
all have to be evaluated separately for regions 1 and 2.  The same applies to the data 
required for their evaluation.  To proceed with this evaluation, therefore, the regions need 
to be defined and appropriate data need to be obtained. 
Given that Australian data is to be used the most obvious way of defining the 
regions is in terms of the Australian states of which there are six: New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania.  We take one of 
these as region 1 and the other five collectively as region 2.  Data for each of Ci, GRi, 
LiWi, GFi, Wi, and Ni are then obtained for each of the two regions thus defined.  The 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that, while this parameterisation is conventional, it is not strictly implied by our model 
specification since in our framework households do not choose Gi but take it as given in maximising utility.  13
figures we use are the average values for the years 1994-95 to 1998-99.  These figures are 
given in Appendix 3. 
To avoid the possibility that the simulation results we are about to report were 
affected by our choice of the state for region 1, we carry out the above procedure six 
times with each of the six states taken as region 1 and the remainder collectively as 
region 2.  In this way we simulate six versions of the linearised model. 
 
4. The simulations 
  In the first section of the paper we pointed out that regional unemployment 
disparities are likely to be of concern to both regional and federal governments.  Both 
types of government can be expected, therefore, to be anxious to implement policies 
which aim to combat this phenomenon. 
  Several policies which a regional government might decide to pursue can be 
examined for effectiveness by means of the linearised version of our two-region model 
which was discussed in section 3. One policy which a federal government might 
implement can be tested in the same way. 
  Policies in the first group are: 
(i)  A tax cut by the government of region 1 (the high  unemployment region) aimed 
at increasing employment in the region both directly and indirectly. 
(ii)  An increase in government expenditure by the government of region 1 aimed at 
increasing employment in the region via aggregate demand channels. 
(iii)  A reduction in the benefit paid by the government of region 1 to unemployed 
persons in the region aimed at strengthening their incentive to find work. 
(iv)  A reduction in region 1’s labour force by measures such as raising the school-
leaving age and encouraging early retirement. 
(v)  Changing the industrial relations laws in region 1 in ways which reduces union 
bargaining-strength. 
(vi)  Undertaking measures which increase the productivity of labour in region 1, for 
example by removing restrictions on logging the region’s forests. 
One policy which a federal government might decide to undertake is:  14
(vii) A regionally-differentiated fiscal policy by which the federal government 
increases its expenditure in region 1 and reducing expenditure in region 2 
while holding its income tax rate fixed. 
 
  Each of these seven policies has been examined for effectiveness by simulating 
each of the six numerical versions of our two-region linearised model.  To simulate the 
first policy, we assumed that the government of region 1 (the high-unemployment region) 
cuts its payroll tax by 1%.  We then identify the exogenous variable through which this 
shock can be imposed on the six numerical versions of the linearised model.  It turns out 
to be ti; a 1% reduction in the rate of payroll tax in region 1 implies t1=-1.  The next step 
in the simulation is to solve the six linear systems for their unknowns – the endogenous 
variables – using t1=-1 and a zero value for all the other exogenous variables. 
  To simulate the second policy we assume that the government of region 1 
increases its expenditure by 1%; and, as with the first policy, identify the exogenous 
variable through which the shock can be imposed on the six numerical versions of our 
model.  Here the key exogenous variable is gr1.  So the second policy is simulated by 
giving gr1 the value 1 and all the other exogenous variables in the model a value of zero 
and then solving the resulting six numerical linear systems for the endogenous variables. 
  Each of the other five policies has been simulated in the same fashion. 
  
5. Simulation results 
The full set of 42 simulation results (seven simulations carried out, in each case, 
six times) is presented in Appendix 4.  In each case the results are given for both the short 
run and the long run as defined in the previous section. A sub-set of results (results for 
seven simulations carried out in each case with Tasmania as region 1 and the rest of the 
country as region 2) are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the text. 
We now examine the results presented in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 and draw 
conclusions about the effectiveness of each of our policies for dealing with 
unemployment-rate disparities.  The reader will be left to check with the full set of results 
given in Appendix 4 that the conclusions we draw hold regardless of which state is 
chosen as region 1.  15
[Table 1 near here] 
Table 1 shows that with policy 1 (a payroll-tax cut by region 1’s government) u1 
is negative in both the short run and the long run while u2 is zero in the short run and 
positive in the long run.  Thus policy 1 is seen to be effective in reducing the initial 
unemployment-rate disparity.   
The mechanism by which the reduction in the unemployment-rate disparity is 
achieved is not difficult to disentangle. The initial effect of the tax cut is to reduce 
employment costs in region 1, so increasing firms’ demand for labour and, with a given 
labour force in the short run, reducing unemployment.  The wage increases via the 
bargaining process but not by enough to offset the increase in employment.   
There is an increase in output (and output per capita) due to the increase in 
employment and so an increase in consumption but the effect of this on utility is more 
than offset by the fall in regional government expenditure necessitated by the tax cut 
working through the regional government’s budget constraint.  There are only small 
effects on region 2, working through a relative price change in favour of good 2. 
The final result in the short run is to leave residents in region 1 worse-off despite 
the fall in unemployment and region 2’s residents slightly better-off. 
Once we move from the short to the long run by allowing inter-regional 
migration to occur, the utility gap which developed in the short run induces migration 
from region 1 to region 2, reducing the labour force in region 1 and increasing it in region 
2.  There is, as a result, a further reduction in unemployment in region 1 and a small 
increase in unemployment in region 2 so that the unemployment gap between the two 
regions narrows further over time.  The long-run equilibrium change in utility is positive 
but trivial in magnitude.  Thus, policy 1 has been successful in reducing the 
unemployment disparity in both the short run and the long run although it has not 
appreciably improved welfare. 
By contrast, the table shows that policy 2 (an increase in expenditure by the 
government in region 1) is not effective since u1 is positive in both the short run and the 
long run while u2 is zero in the short run and negative in the long run.  Thus, in both the 
short run and the long run policy 2 widens, rather than narrows, the unemployment-rate 
disparity.  Why is u1 positive in the short run?  The mechanism is essentially the opposite  16
of that for policy 2.  The increase in government expenditure in region 1 requires a 
payroll-tax increase in that region if the government is to maintain its budgetary balance.  
But this payroll-tax rise increases the cost of employment in region 1 and so reduces the 
level of employment in that region.  With the labour force of each region fixed in the 
short run (recall that in the short run inter-regional migration is ruled out) this downward 
pressure on employment in region 1 must impose an upward pressure on its 
unemployment rate. 
In the long run the effect is intensified because the increase in government 
expenditure in region 1 increases utility in that region and so results in migration from 
region 2 to region 1. This increases the labour force in region 1 and so puts further 
upward pressure on the unemployment rate.  The overall effect is to increase the 
unemployment gap substantially and reduce welfare in both regions, although by only a 
small amount. 
[Table 2 near here] 
Table 2 shows that policy 3 (a cut in unemployment benefits in region 1) is 
effective in reducing an unemployment-rate disparity in the short-run since the 
unemployment rate falls in region 1 while it remains constant in region 2.  It does this 
despite a rise in the real wage in region 1.  This is somewhat counter-intuitive since we 
expect the cut in unemployment benefits to work through a fall in workers’ reservation 
wages and hence a fall in bargained wages.  The key is the effect through the regional 
government’s budget constraint: the reduction in unemployment benefit costs allows 
region 1’s government to reduce payroll taxes and hence employment costs.  This boosts 
firms’ demand for labour, putting upward pressure on the wage which offsets the effect of 
the unemployment benefit reduction.  In the short run the former effect outweighs the 
latter.  Not surprisingly, residents of region 1 are actually better-off as a result of this 
policy since wages and employment both rise.  A relative price change in favour of 
region 2 means that residents of region 2 also benefit from this policy. 
An unemployment benefit cut remains effective in the long run despite (a) the 
fact that the fall in region 1’s unemployment rate is slightly less in the long run than in 
the short run due to the influx of labour caused by region 1’s utility being higher than 
region 2’s; and (b) a slight decrease in region 2’s unemployment rate in the long run.  An  17
inspection of the full results in Appendix 4 shows that the effectiveness of this policy is 
not dependent on the particular state we chose as region 1 but the signs are the same for  
all possible choices. 
In policy 4 it is assumed that the government of region 1 reduces the labour force 
in its region by, e.g., increasing the school-leaving age.  This might reflect the view that 
an excessive unemployment rate results from too few jobs for the number of available 
workers so that a logical policy is to reduce the work force to more closely match the jobs 
available.   
From the results reported in Table 2, this policy appears to work as desired since 
the unemployment rate falls, although not by nearly as much as the fall in the labour 
force.  The reason for the smaller than expected fall in unemployment is the fall in the 
number of jobs – employment falls by almost as much as the fall in the labour force, 
leaving only a modest reduction in the unemployment rate.  The “cause” of this is the rise 
in the wage which accompanies the unemployment-rate reduction.  Nevertheless, the 
residents of region 1 are better-off, as are the residents of region 2 due, again, to a 
favourable relative price change.   
Over time, as inter-regional migration is permitted, people move from region 2 
to region 1 (region1’s short-run increase in welfare exceeds that of region 2)  and the 
short-run improvement in the unemployment situation in region 1 is almost completely 
eroded.  Combined with a small reduction in unemployment in region 2 (as people leave 
for region 1), this means that in the long run the unemployment gap actually widens 
slightly although residents of both regions are still better-off by a small margin.  An 
inspection of the full results in Appendix 4 shows that these effects are not peculiar to our 
choice of Tas as region 1.  Thus policies which have as their main aim a reduction in the 
labour force have only short-run benefits (and ignore other costs such as expenditures that 
might be needed to support the increase in the school-leaving age). 
[Table 3 near here] 
Table 3 shows that policy 5 (a reduction in union power in region 1) is clearly 
effective in the short run since the unemployment rate falls in region 1 and remains 
constant in region 2.  There is, however, a counterintuitive increase in the wage rate in the 
short run.  This occurs because the weaker union power “initially” allows a higher  18
employment level while depressing the wage.  The higher employment level improves the 
regional government’s budget, allowing it to cut the payroll-tax rate (which is 
endogenous in this simulation), reducing firms’ employment costs, thus allowing them to 
offer higher wages which actually more than offsets the “initially” lower wages. 
Residents of region 1 are better-off in the short run as a result of the higher wages and 
higher employment.      
The policy remains effective in the long run, notwithstanding migration from 
region 2 to region1 – in the long run region 1’s employment increases by more than its 
labour force, reducing its unemployment rate. It is interesting to note, though, that in the 
long run the influx from region 2 depresses region 1’s wage by enough to offset the short-
run increase described as counterintuitive above. 
From Table 3 we also see that policy 6 (an increase in labour productivity in 
region 1), like policy 5, is clearly effective in the short run; here, too, the unemployment 
rate falls in region 1 and remains constant in region 2. Given that wages, profits, output, 
consumption and employment all increase while taxes and unemployment decrease, it is 
not surprising that residents of region 1 are clearly better-off.  A favourable relative price 
change also slightly increases welfare in region 2. 
We also see, however, that the long-run effectiveness is questionable.  The 
greater short-run welfare gain in region 1 induces migration from region 2, thus spreading 
the benefits of the productivity improvement across the whole country.  While the short-
run fall in region 1’s unemployment rate is maintained, it is now matched by a substantial 
fall in the unemployment rate in region 2 so that the improvement in the unemployment 
gap in the short run is largely eroded. 
[Table 4 near here] 
Finally, Table 4 shows that policy 7 (a federal government expenditure re-
allocation to region 1) has only small effects in the short run – there is a small 
improvement in welfare in region 1 and an even smaller fall in region 2 as the federal 
government shifts resources from region 2 to region 1.  Not much else changes. In 
particular, unemployment rates remain unaffected.  Thus in the short run the policy is 
completely ineffective to reduce the unemployment gap between the two regions.  This is  19
true no matter which state is chosen as region 1, as an inspection of Table A47 in 
Appendix 4 will show. 
Over time, migration occurs from region 2 to region 1 which increases the 
labour force and employment in region 1 and reduces them in region 2.  The labour force 
effect outweighs the employment effect so that unemployment increases in region 1 and 
falls in region 2.  The policy is therefore counter-productive in the long run and residents 
of both regions are marginally worse-off, although this last effect depends on our choice 
of Tas as region 1. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have addressed the issue of regional unemployment disparities.  
In particular, we have asked whether standard policies for reducing unemployment are 
effective in reducing the gap between the unemployment in one region and that in the rest 
of the nation. 
For this purpose we built a small two-region CGE model which was largely a 
standard Walrasian model.  The model follows recent literature and incorporates free 
migration between the regions in response to welfare differences.  The model admits the 
possibility of equilibrium unemployment because wages are determined by bargaining 
between workers and firms, rather than in the more common labour market of Walrasian 
models in which wages are determined to clear the market so that unemployment can not 
exist in equilibrium.   
The model was linearised in the log differences and calibrated using data for the 
Australian states for the period 1994-95 to 1998-99.  Within the framework of this model 
we simulated the effects of seven different policies, six of them policies carried out by a 
regional government and the seventh by the national government. 
Most of the regional government policies were effective in reducing the 
unemployment-rate disparity, at least in the short run.  Thus a reduction in the payroll-tax 
rate, a reduction in unemployment benefits, a reduction in the labour force, a reduction in 
union power and an increase in productivity in the high-unemployment region were all 
effective in reducing its unemployment rate relative to that of the country as a whole in 
the short run.  In the long run most continued to be effective although the beneficial  20
effects of the reduction in the labour force and the productivity boost were largely eroded 
when inter-regional migration was allowed in the long run.  Only one regional policy had 
a perverse effect: an increase in expenditure by the regional government actually 
exacerbates the unemployment-rate disparity both in the short and long runs.  Finally a 
national government policy of reallocating expenditure from the low unemployment to 
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Table 1: Regional Government Fiscal Policy  
(Region 1 = Tas) 
 
Policy 1: Payroll-Tax Cut 
(t1=-1) 





Short Run  Long Run  Short Run  Long Run 
v1  -0.0255 0.0005  0.0326  -0.0006 
v2  0.0009 0.0005 -0.0012  -0.0006 
c11  0.1738 0.2067 -0.2224  -0.2782 
c21  0.0004 -0.0002  -0.0005  0.0002 
c12  0.1738 0.2067 -0.2224  -0.2782 
c22  0.0004 -0.0002  -0.0005  0.0002 
g1  -0.5149 -0.4897 0.6590  0.6590 
g2  0.0000 -0.0005  0.0000  0.0006 
j1  0.1734 0.2063 -0.2220  -0.2776 
j2  0.0000 -0.0006  0.0000  0.0008 
π1  0.0124 0.0485 -0.0158  -0.0652 
π2  0.0000 -0.0007  0.0000  0.0009 
w1  0.2642 0.2937 -0.3381  -0.3953 
w2  0.0000 -0.0005  0.0000  0.0007 
u1  -0.1983 -0.2204 0.2537  0.2967 
u2  0.0000 0.0008 0.0000  -0.0011 
l1  0.0189 -0.0793  -0.0242  0.1068 
l2  0.0000 0.0023 0.0000  -0.0031 
n1  0.0000 -0.1004  0.0000  0.1351 
n2  0.0000 0.0024 0.0000  -0.0032 
y1  0.0132 -0.0555  -0.0169  0.0747 
y2  0.0000 0.0018 0.0000  -0.0024 
gr1  -0.7814 -0.7430 1.0000  1.0000 
gr2  0.0000 -0.0007  0.0000  0.0010 
t1  -1.0000 -1.0000 1.2798  1.3458 
m  -0.0038 -0.0043 0.0048  0.0057 





Table 2: Cutting Unemployment Benefits and the Labour Force  
(Region 1 = Tas) 
 
Policy 3: Unemployment Benefit 
Cut 
(ub1=-1) 




Short Run  Long Run  Short Run  Long Run 
v1  0.0386 0.0009 0.2476  0.0061 
v2  0.0003 0.0009 0.0024  0.0061 
c11  0.0644 0.0012 0.4133  0.0083 
c21  0.0001 0.0012 0.0012  0.0078 
c12  0.0644 0.0012 0.4133  0.0083 
c22  0.0001 0.0012 0.0012  0.0078 
g1  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
g2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
j1  0.0643 0.0012 0.4121  0.0076 
j2  0.0000 0.0011 0.0000  0.0071 
π1  0.0500 -0.0060  0.3660  0.0067 
π2  0.0000 0.0011 0.0000  0.0069 
w1  0.0704 0.0055 0.4238  0.0078 
w2  0.0000 0.0011 0.0000  0.0067 
u1  -0.8033 -0.7546 -0.3181  -0.0058 
u2  0.0000 -0.0016  0.0000  -0.0104 
l1  0.0765 0.2251 -0.9697  -0.0178 
l2  0.0000 -0.0035  0.0000  -0.0226 
n1  0.0000 0.1532 -1.0000  -0.0184 
n2  0.0000 -0.0036  0.0000  -0.0233 
y1  0.0535 0.1574 -0.6779  -0.0124 
y2  0.0000 -0.0027  0.0000  -0.0175 
t1  -0.3463 -0.2713 -0.4892  -0.0090 
t2  0.0000 -0.0013  0.0000  -0.0085 
m  -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0124  -0.0071 
p  -0.0643 -0.0001 -0.4121  -0.0004 
ub1  -1.0000 -1.0000 0.0000  0.0000 





Table 3: A Cut in Union Power and an Increase in Productivity  
(Region 1 = Tas) 
 
Policy 5: Cut in Union Power 
(ω1=-1) 





Short Run  Long Run  Short Run  Long Run 
v1  0.0494 0.0012 0.7721  0.0183 
v2  0.0004 0.0012 0.0066  0.0183 
c11  0.0825 0.0016 1.2890  0.0247 
c21  0.0002 0.0015 0.0028  0.0234 
c12  0.0825 0.0016 1.2890  0.0247 
c22  0.0002 0.0015 0.0028  0.0234 
g1  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
g2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
j1  0.0823 0.0015 1.2863  0.0235 
j2  0.0000 0.0014 0.0000  0.0222 
π1  0.0641 -0.0077  1.0010  -0.1205 
π2  0.0000 0.0014 0.0000  0.0214 
w1  0.0379 -0.0453  1.4085  0.1099 
w2  0.0000 0.0014 0.0000  0.0211 
u1  -1.0284 -0.9660 -1.0571  -0.0825 
u2  0.0000 -0.0021  0.0000  -0.0324 
l1  0.0980 0.2882 0.1007  3.0722 
l2  0.0000 -0.0045  0.0000  -0.0704 
n1  0.0000 0.1961 0.0000  3.0644 
n2  0.0000 -0.0047  0.0000  -0.0727 
y1  0.0685 0.2015 1.0704  3.1479 
y2  0.0000 -0.0035  0.0000  -0.0547 
t1  -0.2495 -0.1536 -1.6260  -0.1268 
t2  0.0000 -0.0017  0.0000  -0.0264 
m  -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0280  -0.0115 
p  -0.0823 -0.0001 -1.2863  -0.0013 
ω1  -1.0000 -1.0000 0.0000  0.0000 





Table 4: Federal Government Fiscal Policy 
(Region 1 = Tas) 
Policy 7: Government 
Expenditure Re-allocation 
(gf1=1, gf2 endogenous) 
 
Variables 
Short Run  Long Run 
v1  0.0858 -0.0006 
v2  -0.0020 -0.0006 
c11  0.0000 -0.1095 
c21  0.0000 0.0020 
c12  0.0000 -0.1095 
c22  0.0000 0.0020 
g1  0.3410 0.2567 
g2  -0.0092 -0.0082 
j1  0.0000 -0.1095 
j2  0.0000 0.0020 
π1  0.0000 -0.1204 
π2  0.0000 0.0023 
w1  0.0000 -0.0985 
w2  0.0000 0.0017 
u1  0.0000 0.0740 
u2  0.0000 -0.0027 
l1  0.0000 0.3275 
l2  0.0000 -0.0078 
n1  0.0000 0.3345 
n2  0.0000 -0.0079 
y1  0.0000 0.2290 
y2  0.0000 -0.0060 
gr1  0.0000 -0.1279 
gr2  0.0000 0.0025 
gf1  1.0000 1.0000 
gf2  -0.0258 -0.0275 
m  0.0000 0.0000 





Appendix 1: A list of variables 
 V i  =  utility of the representative household, region i, 
 C 1i  =  real private consumption of good 1 per household, region i, 
 C 2i  =  real private consumption of good 2 per household, region i, 
 G i  =  real government-provided consumption per household, region i. 
   M   = rate of federal government income tax, 
  P   = price of good 1 in terms of good 2, and 
 J i   = real household income in region i. 
  ΠHi = real profit distribution per household, region i 
 W i* = real wage income per household, region i 
 U i   = unemployment rate, region i 
 UBi = real unemployment benefits per unemployed person, region i 
 W i,  = real wage per worker, region i   
 L i   = employment, in region i  
 N i   = workforce (= population), region i.   
   Yi = output of the representative firm, region i,  
 D i =  productivity parameter, region i, and  
 F i  = the (exogenous) number of firms in region i..   
 T i   = rate of payroll tax levied by the regional government, region i. 
 A i   = income workers expect to be able to obtain elsewhere, region i  
 UBi = unemployment benefits, region i 
 W
e
i = expected wage, region i 
 GRi = amount of regional government good provided per household, region i.   
 GFi  =amount of national government output provided per household, region i  
  N   = national population 
  ΠFi = firm profits   29
Appendix 2: The linearised version of the model 
The linearized form of the PEGE model is: 
(1’)  i1 i 1 i2 i 2 ii i vc cg =γ +γ +δ      i  =  1,2 
where lower-case letters represent the proportional changes (log differentials) of their 
upper-case counterparts. 
(2’)   cji = -σmm + ji + (j-i)p,         i, j = 1,2 
where σm = M/(1-M) 
(3’)   ji = σjπhiπhi + (σjubi – σjuwiσui)ui + σjuwiwi + σjubiubi,  i = 1,2 
where σjπhi = ΠHi/Ji, σuwi = Wi(1-Ui)/Ji, σjubi = UiUBi/Ji, σui = Ui/(1-Ui) 
(4’) ui = (1/σui)(ni-li)      i  =  1,2 
(5’)   v1 = v2  
(6’)   yi = di + αi(li – fi),        i  =  1,2 
(7’)   πfi = σπfyi yi - σπfwi(σtiti + li – fi + wi),     i = 1,2 
(8’)   di + (αi-1)(li – fi) = wi + σtiti,       i  =  1,2 
(9’) wi – σwwubiwi + σubwubiubi + ωi – ui = 0,     i = 1,2 
where σwwubi = Wi/(Wi-UBi), σubwubi = UBi/(Wi-UBi) 
(10’) (σui + σgrubi)ui + wi + ti – σgrgrigri – σgrubiubi = 0,  i = 1,2 
where σgrgri = GRi/(GRi+UiUBi), σgrubi = UiUBi/(GRi+UiUBi), i = 1,2 
(11’) (σgf1-σj1)n1 + (σgf2-σj2)n2 + σgf1gf1 +σgf2gf2 – m –σj1j1 –σj2j2 = 0, 
(12’) gi = σggrigri + σggfigfi   i = 1,2 
where σggri = GRi/Gi, σggfi = GFi/Gi. 
(13’)  σn1 + σn2 = n, 
where σni = Ni/N 
(14’)   fi + πfi – ni – πhi = 0 
(15’) fi + yi = σyci1(n1 + ci1) + σyci2(n2 + ci2) + σygri(ni + gri) + σymji(ni + ji + m),  
          i  =  1,2 
where σycij=NjCij/FiYi, σygri=NiGRi/FiYi, σymji=NiMJi/FiYi 
(16’) c21 = p + c12  
Equations (1´)-(16´) constitute a linear system of 30 equation in the 28 endogenous 
variables: vi,  cij, gi, πhi, πfi, ui, wi, li, ni, p, yi, ji, ti and m and the exogenous variables gri 
and gfi, ubi, fi, ωi, di and n. Two equations are redundant and we drop equations (15’).  30
Appendix 3: Data-Base 
 
  Total  corresponding  to       
  C ($m)  GR ($m)  LW ($m)  GF ($m)  W ($’000)  L ( ‘000)  Y/L ($’000) 
Region  1  NSW  112265.4  20189.8 92160.8 -192.3  32.8618 2804.5  47.2295 
Region  2  ROC  195152.8  36096.6 15227.8 192.3  29.0498 5343.5  43.2768 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4 247388.6  0.0  30.3619 8148  44.6373 
Region 1 Vic  80040.8  13545.4  65680.6 -686.9  31.3078 2097.9  44.6095 
Region 2 ROC  227377.4  42741  181708  686.9  30.0339  6050.1  44.6469 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4 247388.6  0.0  30.3619 8148  44.6373 
Region 1 Qld  55026  9662.6  42041.6  -83.3  27.2096  1545.1  41.8669 
Region  2  ROC  252392.2  46623.8 205347  83.3  31.0995 6602.9  45.2856 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4 247388.6  0.0  30.3619 8148  44.6373 
Region  1  SA  23339.2 4906.8  18088.6 826.0  27.7773 651.2  43.3753 
Region  2  ROC  284079  51379.6 229300  -826.0  30.5864 7496.8  44.7469 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4 247388.6  0.0  30.3619 8148  44.6373 
Region 1 WA  29616  6259.6  24236.8  -383.0  28.4236  852.7  42.0729 
Region  2  ROC  277802.2  50026.8 223151.8  383.0  30.5884 7295.3  44.9370 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4 247388.6  0.0  30.3619 8148  44.6373 
Region  1  Tas  7130.8 1722.2 5180.2 519.4  26.3489  196.6  45.0305 
Region  2  ROC  300287.4  54564.2 242208.4  -519.4  30.4611 7951.4  44.6276 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4 247388.6  0.0  30.3619 8148  44.6373 
  Sources:  Ci, Li, LWi and GRi are from ABS times series averaged over the period 1994/95 - 1998/99.  Time-series data on interstate imports are not reported by 
the ABS so that in each case C11 was set at 80% of C1 and C21 at 20% of C1.  C12 was then chosen to ensure a zero balance of trade in the initial equilibrium and 
C22 was chosen as C2 – C12.  GFi is computed as Li (MGFi/Li - MGF/L) where MGFi is final consumption expenditure by the federal government plus grants to 
state i.  All other data are calculated from these figures to ensure that the model constraints hold:  L = L1 + L2, Wi = WiLi/Li, Yi = GRi + Ci, Gi = GRi+GFi, Ti = 
GRi/WiLi.  It should be noted that, as the model excludes investment and net overseas exports, Yi will not conform with official figures.  Pi was set at 1 for each i 
in the initial equilibrium.   31
Appendix 4: Simulation results for all states 
 Table A41 
Policy 1: A payroll-tax cut (t1=-1, gr1 endogenous)  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
v1  -0.0250  0.0009 -0.0255  0.0005 -0.0251  0.0016 -0.0270  0.0011 -0.0308  -0.0011 -0.0255  0.0005 
v2  0.0168 0.0009 0.0107 0.0005 0.0074 0.0016 0.0030 0.0011 0.0040 -0.0011 0.0009 0.0005 
c11  0.1471 0.1848 0.1452 0.1815 0.1571 0.1925 0.1619 0.1981 0.1716 0.2105  0.1738 0.2067 
c21  0.0052  -0.0172 0.0037  -0.0099 0.0028  -0.0049 0.0012  -0.0012 0.0016  -0.0046  0.0004  -0.0002 
c12  0.1471 0.1848 0.1452 0.1815 0.1571 0.1925 0.1619 0.1981 0.1716 0.2105  0.1738 0.2067 
c22  0.0052  -0.0172 0.0037  -0.0099 0.0028  -0.0049 0.0012  -0.0012 0.0016  -0.0046  0.0004  -0.0002 
g1  -0.5630 -0.5363 -0.5543 -0.5292 -0.5497 -0.5236 -0.5397 -0.5126 -0.5818 -0.5526  -0.5149 -0.4897 
g2  0.0000  -0.0174 0.0000  -0.0108 0.0000  -0.0063 0.0000  -0.0020 0.0000  -0.0046  0.0000  -0.0005 
j1  0.1419 0.1800 0.1415 0.1778 0.1543 0.1897 0.1607 0.1968 0.1700 0.2092  0.1734 0.2063 
j2  0.0000  -0.0220 0.0000  -0.0136 0.0000  -0.0078 0.0000  -0.0025 0.0000  -0.0059  0.0000  -0.0006 
pi1  0.0042 0.0478 0.0046 0.0466 0.0080 0.0486 0.0084 0.0481 0.0063 0.0560  0.0124 0.0485 
pi2  0.0000  -0.0256 0.0000  -0.0157 0.0000  -0.0091 0.0000  -0.0029 0.0000  -0.0068  0.0000  -0.0007 
w1  0.1879 0.2232 0.1872 0.2206 0.2135 0.2455 0.2361 0.2691 0.2142 0.2494  0.2642 0.2937 
w2  0.0000  -0.0192 0.0000  -0.0119 0.0000  -0.0069 0.0000  -0.0022 0.0000  -0.0052  0.0000  -0.0005 
u1  -0.0897 -0.1066 -0.0950 -0.1119 -0.1396 -0.1605 -0.1603 -0.1827 -0.1240 -0.1444  -0.1983 -0.2204 
u2  0.0000 0.0303 0.0000 0.0185 0.0000 0.0104 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000 0.0080  0.0000 0.0008 
l1  0.0057  -0.1574 0.0063  -0.1476 0.0114  -0.1176 0.0124  -0.1055 0.0084  -0.1881  0.0189  -0.0793 
l2  0.0000 0.0831 0.0000 0.0520 0.0000 0.0311 0.0000 0.0099 0.0000 0.0226  0.0000 0.0023 
n1  0.0000  -0.1641 0.0000  -0.1550 0.0000  -0.1308 0.0000  -0.1196 0.0000  -0.1978  0.0000  -0.1004 
n2  0.0000 0.0854 0.0000 0.0533 0.0000 0.0318 0.0000 0.0102 0.0000 0.0231  0.0000 0.0024 
y1  0.0044  -0.1233 0.0050  -0.1155 0.0086  -0.0885 0.0090  -0.0759 0.0069  -0.1544  0.0132  -0.0555 
y2  0.0000 0.0640 0.0000 0.0401 0.0000 0.0243 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0174  0.0000 0.0018 
gr1  -0.8751 -0.8336 -0.8824 -0.8424 -0.8594 -0.8185 -0.8170 -0.7759 -0.8419 -0.7998  -0.7814 -0.7430 
gr2  0.0000  -0.0268 0.0000  -0.0166 0.0000  -0.0097 0.0000  -0.0031 0.0000  -0.0072  0.0000  -0.0007 
t1  -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000 -1.0000  -1.0000 -1.0000 
m  -0.0520 -0.0485 -0.0372 -0.0373 -0.0277 -0.0291 -0.0120 -0.0129 -0.0160 -0.0134  -0.0038 -0.0043 
p  -0.1419 -0.2020 -0.1415 -0.1913 -0.1543 -0.1975 -0.1607 -0.1993 -0.1700 -0.2151  -0.1734 -0.2069 
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Table A42 
Policy 2: An increase in regional government expenditure (rg1=1, t1 endogenous)  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
v1  0.0286  -0.0011 0.0289  -0.0007 0.0292  -0.0019 0.0330  -0.0015 0.0366  0.0014  0.0326  -0.0006 
v2  -0.0192 -0.0011 -0.0122 -0.0007 -0.0087 -0.0019 -0.0036 -0.0015 -0.0048 0.0014  -0.0012 -0.0006 
c11  -0.1681 -0.2217 -0.1646 -0.2154 -0.1828 -0.2352 -0.1982 -0.2553 -0.2038 -0.2632  -0.2224 -0.2782 
c21  -0.0059  0.0207 -0.0042  0.0117 -0.0032  0.0060 -0.0015  0.0016 -0.0019  0.0058  -0.0005  0.0002 
c12  -0.1681 -0.2217 -0.1646 -0.2154 -0.1828 -0.2352 -0.1982 -0.2553 -0.2038 -0.2632  -0.2224 -0.2782 
c22  -0.0059  0.0207 -0.0042  0.0117 -0.0032  0.0060 -0.0015  0.0016 -0.0019  0.0058  -0.0005  0.0002 
g1  0.6433 0.6433 0.6282 0.6282 0.6397 0.6397 0.6607 0.6607 0.6910 0.6910  0.6590 0.6590 
g2  0.0000 0.0208 0.0000 0.0128 0.0000 0.0076 0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 0.0058  0.0000 0.0006 
j1  -0.1622 -0.2159 -0.1604 -0.2110 -0.1796 -0.2317 -0.1968 -0.2536 -0.2019 -0.2616  -0.2220 -0.2776 
j2  0.0000 0.0264 0.0000 0.0161 0.0000 0.0095 0.0000 0.0032 0.0000 0.0074  0.0000 0.0008 
pi1  -0.0048 -0.0573 -0.0053 -0.0553 -0.0093 -0.0593 -0.0103 -0.0620 -0.0075 -0.0700  -0.0158 -0.0652 
pi2  0.0000 0.0308 0.0000 0.0187 0.0000 0.0111 0.0000 0.0038 0.0000 0.0085  0.0000 0.0009 
w1  -0.2147 -0.2678 -0.2121 -0.2619 -0.2485 -0.2999 -0.2889 -0.3468 -0.2545 -0.3119  -0.3381 -0.3953 
w2  0.0000 0.0230 0.0000 0.0141 0.0000 0.0084 0.0000 0.0028 0.0000 0.0065  0.0000 0.0007 
u1  0.1026 0.1279 0.1076 0.1329 0.1625 0.1961 0.1962 0.2355 0.1473 0.1805  0.2537 0.2967 
u2  0.0000  -0.0363 0.0000  -0.0219 0.0000  -0.0128 0.0000  -0.0043 0.0000  -0.0100  0.0000  -0.0011 
l1  -0.0065  0.1888 -0.0072  0.1752 -0.0133  0.1437 -0.0152  0.1359 -0.0099  0.2351  -0.0242  0.1068 
l2  0.0000  -0.0997 0.0000  -0.0617 0.0000  -0.0380 0.0000  -0.0128 0.0000  -0.0282  0.0000  -0.0031 
n1  0.0000 0.1969 0.0000 0.1840 0.0000 0.1597 0.0000 0.1542 0.0000 0.2473  0.0000 0.1351 
n2  0.0000  -0.1024 0.0000  -0.0633 0.0000  -0.0389 0.0000  -0.0131 0.0000  -0.0289  0.0000  -0.0032 
y1  -0.0051  0.1479 -0.0056  0.1372 -0.0100  0.1081 -0.0110  0.0978 -0.0082  0.1930  -0.0169  0.0747 
y2  0.0000  -0.0767 0.0000  -0.0476 0.0000  -0.0297 0.0000  -0.0100 0.0000  -0.0217  0.0000  -0.0024 
gr1  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  1.0000 1.0000 
gr2  0.0000 0.0322 0.0000 0.0197 0.0000 0.0118 0.0000 0.0039 0.0000 0.0090  0.0000 0.0010 
t1  1.1428 1.1997 1.1333 1.1871 1.1636 1.2217 1.2241 1.2889 1.1878 1.2504  1.2798 1.3458 
m  0.0594 0.0582 0.0422 0.0443 0.0323 0.0356 0.0147 0.0166 0.0190 0.0167  0.0048 0.0057 




Policy 3: A cut in unemployment benefits( ub1=-1, t1 endogenous)  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
v1  0.0185 0.0093 0.0205 0.0076 0.0314 0.0077 0.0292 0.0026 0.0247 0.0046  0.0386 0.0009 
v2  0.0033 0.0093 0.0024 0.0076 0.0024 0.0077 0.0009 0.0026 0.0009 0.0046  0.0003 0.0009 
c11  0.0291 0.0117 0.0323 0.0096 0.0504 0.0099 0.0476 0.0034 0.0402 0.0060  0.0644 0.0012 
c21  0.0010 0.0119 0.0008 0.0098 0.0009 0.0098 0.0004 0.0033 0.0004 0.0058  0.0001 0.0012 
c12  0.0291 0.0117 0.0323 0.0096 0.0504 0.0099 0.0476 0.0034 0.0402 0.0060  0.0644 0.0012 
c22  0.0010 0.0119 0.0008 0.0098 0.0009 0.0098 0.0004 0.0033 0.0004 0.0058  0.0001 0.0012 
g1  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
g2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
j1  0.0281 0.0105 0.0315 0.0088 0.0495 0.0091 0.0472 0.0032 0.0398 0.0054  0.0643 0.0012 
j2  0.0000 0.0107 0.0000 0.0089 0.0000 0.0090 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0052  0.0000 0.0011 
pi1  0.0229 0.0057 0.0256 0.0032 0.0394 0.0006 0.0376 -0.0025  0.0307 -0.0054 0.0500 -0.0060 
pi2  0.0000 0.0103 0.0000 0.0086 0.0000 0.0087 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0050  0.0000 0.0011 
w1  0.0293 0.0120 0.0329 0.0106 0.0524 0.0126 0.0508 0.0060 0.0415 0.0085  0.0704 0.0055 
w2  0.0000 0.0102 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0086 0.0000 0.0029 0.0000 0.0050  0.0000 0.0011 
u1  -0.4917 -0.4834 -0.5242 -0.5129 -0.6882 -0.6621 -0.7136 -0.6832 -0.6029 -0.5838  -0.8033 -0.7546 
u2  0.0000  -0.0161 0.0000  -0.0132 0.0000  -0.0130 0.0000  -0.0044 0.0000  -0.0076  0.0000  -0.0016 
l1  0.0310 0.0949 0.0349 0.1167 0.0563 0.1779 0.0554 0.1724 0.0407 0.1819  0.0765 0.2251 
l2  0.0000  -0.0324 0.0000  -0.0275 0.0000  -0.0293 0.0000  -0.0098 0.0000  -0.0161  0.0000  -0.0035 
n1  0.0000 0.0645 0.0000 0.0825 0.0000 0.1237 0.0000 0.1194 0.0000 0.1425  0.0000 0.1532 
n2  0.0000  -0.0335 0.0000  -0.0284 0.0000  -0.0301 0.0000  -0.0101 0.0000  -0.0167  0.0000  -0.0036 
y1  0.0243 0.0744 0.0273 0.0913 0.0424 0.1339 0.0399 0.1241 0.0334 0.1493  0.0535 0.1574 
y2  0.0000  -0.0249 0.0000  -0.0212 0.0000  -0.0228 0.0000  -0.0077 0.0000  -0.0124  0.0000  -0.0027 
t1  -0.1906 -0.1720 -0.2147 -0.1905 -0.3066 -0.2616 -0.2770 -0.2268 -0.2262 -0.1902  -0.3463 -0.2713 
t2  0.0000  -0.0130 0.0000  -0.0107 0.0000  -0.0106 0.0000  -0.0036 0.0000  -0.0063  0.0000  -0.0013 
m  -0.0103 -0.0120 -0.0083 -0.0086 -0.0089 -0.0077 -0.0035 -0.0026 -0.0038 -0.0060  -0.0014 -0.0006 
p  -0.0281 0.0003  -0.0315 0.0001  -0.0495 -0.0001 -0.0472 -0.0001 -0.0398 -0.0002  -0.0643 -0.0001 




Policy 4: A unit reduction in labour force (n1=-1, n=-σn1)   
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
v1  0.1790 0.0888 0.1793 0.0667 0.2078 0.0512 0.2284 0.0206 0.1492 0.0273  0.2476 0.0061 
v2  0.0312 0.0888 0.0211 0.0667 0.0164 0.0512 0.0071 0.0206 0.0054 0.0273  0.0024 0.0061 
c11  0.2814 0.1120 0.2826 0.0844 0.3331 0.0661 0.3719 0.0270 0.2431 0.0359  0.4133 0.0083 
c21  0.0085 0.1146 0.0074 0.0857 0.0067 0.0654 0.0031 0.0263 0.0018 0.0349  0.0012 0.0078 
c12  0.2814 0.1120 0.2826 0.0844 0.3331 0.0661 0.3719 0.0270 0.2431 0.0359  0.4133 0.0083 
c22  0.0085 0.1146 0.0074 0.0857 0.0067 0.0654 0.0031 0.0263 0.0018 0.0349  0.0012 0.0078 
g1  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
g2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
j1  0.2729 0.1018 0.2752 0.0767 0.3264 0.0602 0.3689 0.0246 0.2413 0.0328  0.4121 0.0076 
j2  0.0000 0.1044 0.0000 0.0780 0.0000 0.0595 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000 0.0317  0.0000 0.0071 
pi1  0.2669 0.0996 0.2720 0.0758 0.3133 0.0578 0.3352 0.0224 0.2529 0.0343  0.3660 0.0067 
pi2  0.0000 0.1001 0.0000 0.0747 0.0000 0.0574 0.0000 0.0232 0.0000 0.0304  0.0000 0.0069 
w1  0.2696 0.1006 0.2703 0.0754 0.3218 0.0594 0.3754 0.0251 0.2320 0.0315  0.4238 0.0078 
w2  0.0000 0.0989 0.0000 0.0741 0.0000 0.0565 0.0000 0.0226 0.0000 0.0301  0.0000 0.0067 
u1  -0.1288 -0.0481 -0.1372 -0.0383 -0.2105 -0.0388 -0.2549 -0.0170 -0.1343 -0.0182  -0.3181 -0.0058 
u2  0.0000  -0.1564 0.0000  -0.1151 0.0000  -0.0858 0.0000  -0.0346 0.0000  -0.0463  0.0000  -0.0104 
l1  -0.9919 -0.3702 -0.9909 -0.2763 -0.9828 -0.1813 -0.9802 -0.0655 -0.9909 -0.1345  -0.9697 -0.0178 
l2  0.0000  -0.3145 0.0000  -0.2399 0.0000  -0.1928 0.0000  -0.0768 0.0000  -0.0979  0.0000  -0.0226 
n1  -1.0000 -0.3732 -1.0000 -0.2788 -1.0000 -0.1845 -1.0000 -0.0668 -1.0000 -0.1357  -1.0000 -0.0184 
n2  0.0000  -0.3260 0.0000  -0.2480 0.0000  -0.1986 0.0000  -0.0792 0.0000  -0.1011  0.0000  -0.0233 
y1  -0.7769 -0.2899 -0.7757 -0.2163 -0.7396 -0.1365 -0.7056 -0.0471 -0.8135 -0.1104  -0.6779 -0.0124 
y2  0.0000  -0.2420 0.0000  -0.1851 0.0000  -0.1503 0.0000  -0.0598 0.0000  -0.0753  0.0000  -0.0175 
t1  -0.2890 -0.1078 -0.2927 -0.0816 -0.3637 -0.0671 -0.4205 -0.0281 -0.2532 -0.0344  -0.4892 -0.0090 
t2  0.0000  -0.1264 0.0000  -0.0934 0.0000  -0.0702 0.0000  -0.0283 0.0000  -0.0379  0.0000  -0.0085 
m  -0.0859 -0.1028 -0.0751 -0.0778 -0.0675 -0.0595 -0.0311 -0.0239 -0.0183 -0.0317  -0.0124 -0.0071 
n  0.0000  -0.3421 0.0000  -0.2559 0.0000  -0.1958 0.0000  -0.0782 0.0000  -0.1048  0.0000  -0.0232 




Policy 5: A reduction in union power (ω1=-1)   
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
v1  0.0380 0.0190 0.0395 0.0147 0.0466 0.0114 0.0417 0.0037 0.0416 0.0077  0.0494 0.0012 
v2  0.0068 0.0190 0.0046 0.0147 0.0035 0.0114 0.0012 0.0037 0.0016 0.0077  0.0004 0.0012 
c11  0.0597 0.0239 0.0623 0.0186 0.0747 0.0147 0.0679 0.0049 0.0677 0.0101  0.0825 0.0016 
c21  0.0021 0.0245 0.0016 0.0189 0.0013 0.0145 0.0005 0.0047 0.0006 0.0098  0.0002 0.0015 
c12  0.0597 0.0239 0.0623 0.0186 0.0747 0.0147 0.0679 0.0049 0.0677 0.0101  0.0825 0.0016 
c22  0.0021 0.0245 0.0016 0.0189 0.0013 0.0145 0.0005 0.0047 0.0006 0.0098  0.0002 0.0015 
g1  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
g2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
j1  0.0576 0.0215 0.0607 0.0169 0.0733 0.0135 0.0674 0.0045 0.0671 0.0091  0.0823 0.0015 
j2  0.0000 0.0220 0.0000 0.0172 0.0000 0.0134 0.0000 0.0044 0.0000 0.0088  0.0000 0.0014 
pi1  0.0470 0.0117 0.0494 0.0061 0.0583 0.0009 0.0536 -0.0035  0.0517 -0.0091 0.0641 -0.0077 
pi2  0.0000 0.0211 0.0000 0.0165 0.0000 0.0129 0.0000 0.0042 0.0000 0.0085  0.0000 0.0014 
w1  0.0184  -0.0173 0.0203  -0.0228 0.0297  -0.0293 0.0278  -0.0362 0.0283  -0.0274  0.0379  -0.0453 
w2  0.0000 0.0209 0.0000 0.0163 0.0000 0.0127 0.0000 0.0041 0.0000 0.0084  0.0000 0.0014 
u1  -1.0088 -0.9918 -1.0103 -0.9885 -1.0194 -0.9808 -1.0189 -0.9754 -1.0164 -0.9841  -1.0284 -0.9660 
u2  0.0000  -0.0330 0.0000  -0.0254 0.0000  -0.0193 0.0000  -0.0063 0.0000  -0.0129  0.0000  -0.0021 
l1  0.0636 0.1948 0.0672 0.2249 0.0834 0.2636 0.0791 0.2462 0.0685 0.3066  0.0980 0.2882 
l2  0.0000  -0.0664 0.0000  -0.0529 0.0000  -0.0433 0.0000  -0.0140 0.0000  -0.0272  0.0000  -0.0045 
n1  0.0000 0.1323 0.0000 0.1591 0.0000 0.1833 0.0000 0.1705 0.0000 0.2403  0.0000 0.1961 
n2  0.0000  -0.0688 0.0000  -0.0547 0.0000  -0.0446 0.0000  -0.0145 0.0000  -0.0281  0.0000  -0.0047 
y1  0.0498 0.1526 0.0526 0.1760 0.0628 0.1984 0.0569 0.1772 0.0563 0.2517  0.0685 0.2015 
y2  0.0000  -0.0511 0.0000  -0.0408 0.0000  -0.0338 0.0000  -0.0109 0.0000  -0.0209  0.0000  -0.0035 
t1  -0.1701 -0.1319 -0.1848 -0.1383 -0.2326 -0.1660 -0.2084 -0.1367 -0.1882 -0.1274  -0.2495 -0.1536 
t2  0.0000  -0.0267 0.0000  -0.0206 0.0000  -0.0158 0.0000  -0.0052 0.0000  -0.0105  0.0000  -0.0017 
m  -0.0211 -0.0247 -0.0160 -0.0165 -0.0132 -0.0114 -0.0050 -0.0037 -0.0063 -0.0100  -0.0018 -0.0007 
p  -0.0576 0.0005  -0.0607 0.0003  -0.0733 -0.0002 -0.0674 -0.0001 -0.0671 -0.0003  -0.0823 -0.0001 




Policy 6: A unit increase in labour productivity (d1=1) 
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
v1  0.7856 0.3921 0.7757 0.2881 0.7801 0.1902 0.7692 0.0684 0.7697 0.1424  0.7721 0.0183 
v2  0.1406 0.3921 0.0905 0.2881 0.0593 0.1902 0.0230 0.0684 0.0293 0.1424  0.0066 0.0183 
c11  1.2335 0.4946 1.2229 0.3645 1.2510 0.2457 1.2532 0.0898 1.2533 0.1870  1.2890 0.0247 
c21  0.0432 0.5059 0.0310 0.3700 0.0219 0.2429 0.0092 0.0874 0.0116 0.1817  0.0028 0.0234 
c12  1.2335 0.4946 1.2229 0.3645 1.2510 0.2457 1.2532 0.0898 1.2533 0.1870  1.2890 0.0247 
c22  0.0432 0.5059 0.0310 0.3700 0.0219 0.2429 0.0092 0.0874 0.0116 0.1817  0.0028 0.0234 
g1  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
g2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
j1  1.1903 0.4441 1.1919 0.3324 1.2291 0.2268 1.2440 0.0830 1.2417 0.1686  1.2863 0.0235 
j2  0.0000 0.4554 0.0000 0.3379 0.0000 0.2240 0.0000 0.0806 0.0000 0.1633  0.0000 0.0222 
pi1  0.9713 0.2417 0.9694 0.1200 0.9770 0.0147 0.9901 -0.0649  0.9565 -0.1683 1.0010 -0.1205 
pi2  0.0000 0.4366 0.0000 0.3236 0.0000 0.2163 0.0000 0.0781 0.0000 0.1566  0.0000 0.0214 
w1  1.2441 0.5069 1.2450 0.4007 1.3009 0.3125 1.3398 0.1584 1.2960 0.2640  1.4085 0.1099 
w2  0.0000 0.4313 0.0000 0.3207 0.0000 0.2127 0.0000 0.0762 0.0000 0.1551  0.0000 0.0211 
u1  -0.5942 -0.2421 -0.6318 -0.2034 -0.8506 -0.2043 -0.9098 -0.1076 -0.7502 -0.1529  -1.0571 -0.0825 
u2  0.0000  -0.6820 0.0000  -0.4983 0.0000  -0.3231 0.0000  -0.1167 0.0000  -0.2383  0.0000  -0.0324 
l1  0.0375 2.7494 0.0420 3.1368 0.0696 3.0879 0.0706 3.1558 0.0506 4.4580  0.1007 3.0722 
l2  0.0000  -1.3718 0.0000  -1.0389 0.0000  -0.7262 0.0000  -0.2589 0.0000  -0.5037  0.0000  -0.0704 
n1  0.0000 2.7341 0.0000 3.1233 0.0000 3.0712 0.0000 3.1475 0.0000 4.4477  0.0000 3.0644 
n2  0.0000  -1.4220 0.0000  -1.0743 0.0000  -0.7478 0.0000  -0.2670 0.0000  -0.5204  0.0000  -0.0727 
y1  1.0293 3.1535 1.0329 3.4557 1.0524 3.3240 1.0508 3.2717 1.0415 4.6599  1.0704 3.1479 
y2  0.0000  -1.0557 0.0000  -0.8016 0.0000  -0.5660 0.0000  -0.2017 0.0000  -0.3876  0.0000  -0.0547 
t1  -1.3334 -0.5433 -1.3479 -0.4339 -1.4702 -0.3531 -1.5011 -0.1775 -1.4140 -0.2881  -1.6260 -0.1268 
t2  0.0000  -0.5512 0.0000  -0.4047 0.0000  -0.2642 0.0000  -0.0956 0.0000  -0.1952  0.0000  -0.0264 
m  -0.4363 -0.5100 -0.3133 -0.3248 -0.2209 -0.1908 -0.0931 -0.0687 -0.1171 -0.1857  -0.0280 -0.0115 
p  -1.1903 0.0113  -1.1919 0.0055  -1.2291 -0.0027 -1.2440 -0.0025 -1.2417 -0.0053  -1.2863 -0.0013 
d1  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  1.0000 1.0000 
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 Table A47 
Policy 7: A regional re-allocation of national government expenditure (gf1=1, gf2 endogenous)  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
v1  0.0752 0.0020 0.0789 0.0022 0.0807 0.0000 0.0795 -0.0013  0.0723 0.0040  0.0858 -0.0006 
v2  -0.0428 0.0020  -0.0278 0.0022  -0.0178 0.0000  -0.0066 -0.0013 -0.0077 0.0040  -0.0020 -0.0006 
c11  0.0000  -0.1065 0.0000  -0.1068 0.0000  -0.1073 0.0000  -0.1038 0.0000  -0.0895  0.0000  -0.1095 
c21  0.0000 0.0616 0.0000 0.0400 0.0000 0.0237 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000 0.0135  0.0000 0.0020 
c12  0.0000  -0.1065 0.0000  -0.1068 0.0000  -0.1073 0.0000  -0.1038 0.0000  -0.0895  0.0000  -0.1095 
c22  0.0000 0.0616 0.0000 0.0400 0.0000 0.0237 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000 0.0135  0.0000 0.0020 
g1  0.3567 0.2820 0.3718 0.2978 0.3603 0.2809 0.3393 0.2612 0.3090 0.2425  0.3410 0.2567 
g2  -0.1922 -0.1383 -0.1261 -0.0944 -0.0820 -0.0649 -0.0303 -0.0255 -0.0355 -0.0226  -0.0092 -0.0082 
j1  0.0000  -0.1065 0.0000  -0.1068 0.0000  -0.1073 0.0000  -0.1038 0.0000  -0.0895  0.0000  -0.1095 
j2  0.0000 0.0616 0.0000 0.0400 0.0000 0.0237 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000 0.0135  0.0000 0.0020 
pi1  0.0000  -0.1219 0.0000  -0.1236 0.0000  -0.1233 0.0000  -0.1142 0.0000  -0.1134  0.0000  -0.1204 
pi2  0.0000 0.0717 0.0000 0.0464 0.0000 0.0275 0.0000 0.0084 0.0000 0.0156  0.0000 0.0023 
w1  0.0000  -0.0988 0.0000  -0.0984 0.0000  -0.0970 0.0000  -0.0951 0.0000  -0.0803  0.0000  -0.0985 
w2  0.0000 0.0536 0.0000 0.0350 0.0000 0.0209 0.0000 0.0063 0.0000 0.0119  0.0000 0.0017 
u1  0.0000 0.0472 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000 0.0634 0.0000 0.0646 0.0000 0.0465  0.0000 0.0740 
u2  0.0000  -0.0847 0.0000  -0.0544 0.0000  -0.0317 0.0000  -0.0097 0.0000  -0.0183  0.0000  -0.0027 
l1  0.0000 0.4561 0.0000 0.4533 0.0000 0.3919 0.0000 0.3394 0.0000 0.4483  0.0000 0.3275 
l2  0.0000  -0.2325 0.0000  -0.1532 0.0000  -0.0946 0.0000  -0.0286 0.0000  -0.0515  0.0000  -0.0078 
n1  0.0000 0.4590 0.0000 0.4567 0.0000 0.3971 0.0000 0.3444 0.0000 0.4514  0.0000 0.3345 
n2  0.0000  -0.2387 0.0000  -0.1571 0.0000  -0.0967 0.0000  -0.0292 0.0000  -0.0528  0.0000  -0.0079 
y1  0.0000 0.3572 0.0000 0.3549 0.0000 0.2949 0.0000 0.2443 0.0000 0.3680  0.0000 0.2290 
y2  0.0000  -0.1789 0.0000  -0.1182 0.0000  -0.0737 0.0000  -0.0222 0.0000  -0.0397  0.0000  -0.0060 
gr1  0.0000  -0.1161 0.0000  -0.1179 0.0000  -0.1241 0.0000  -0.1183 0.0000  -0.0962  0.0000  -0.1279 
gr2  0.0000 0.0750 0.0000 0.0489 0.0000 0.0294 0.0000 0.0088 0.0000 0.0164  0.0000 0.0025 
gf1  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  1.0000 1.0000 
gf2  -0.5441 -0.5288 -0.3618 -0.3622 -0.2323 -0.2375 -0.0851 -0.0877 -0.0987 -0.0921  -0.0258 -0.0275 
p  0.0000 0.1681 0.0000 0.1468 0.0000 0.1310 0.0000 0.1110 0.0000 0.1030  0.0000 0.1114 
 
 